Three-source evaluation
By UK A Level History · independent study · myAudience
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Three-source evaluation
Practice question: assess the usefulness of the following documents for investigating why negotiations over Berlin were difficult in 1948: Marshall's 20 July telegram (document 584), the Soviet 25 September note (document 664), and Bohlen's 16 October memorandum (document 683).
Marshall's telegram is useful for the choices US officials faced before the later breakdown. Its immediate aim is removal of the land blockade. It assesses a Soviet food offer and considers an oral approach, written replies, recourse to the United Nations and possible further measures. This shows officials evaluating several paths rather than assuming that one response was inevitable. Its discussion of prestige is especially useful: a message might appear weak or might make the opponent less willing to compromise.
The confidential diplomatic audience strengthens its value for planning, but does not make it a neutral description of Soviet intentions. Marshall was directing US representatives and criticising a British draft. The source records US concerns and judgments at that moment. It cannot tell us whether contemplated convoys or sanctions were eventually adopted, whether the food offer was implemented, or why Soviet decision-makers made every choice. A planning document is strongest for contemplated policy, and needs outcome evidence before supporting claims about effects.
The Soviet note provides a contrasting formal position. It describes Western currency changes as damaging to the Soviet zone and treats implementation of the 30 August framework as central. Its conditions concerning currency, trade and air traffic show why practical administration mattered. It is particularly useful for identifying what the Soviet government demanded and how it justified those demands to other governments. The explicitly conditional framework helps explain why agreement in principle did not settle implementation.
Its diplomatic purpose also limits it. The ambassador communicated an authorised government position, not an independent economic assessment or private record of Stalin's deliberations. Blame directed at Western governments could serve the negotiation and public defence of Soviet policy. We should neither accept its accusations as established fact nor dismiss the note because it advances an argument. The relevant question is what that argument reveals about obstacles and possible terms. The version read here is a translation in the US-edited FRUS series; the Russian original and a complete Soviet archive have not been independently checked.
Bohlen's memorandum is valuable for the later Western interpretation of failure. He urges representatives to frame the issue as political pressure against occupation rights rather than a technical disagreement. That distinction helps explain why proposed currency arrangements might be rejected even if they addressed some practical problems: officials could consider the larger implications unacceptable. His account also names the conditions from which Western officials drew their conclusion about Soviet intentions.
Again, the source's purpose requires care. It prepared a position for diplomatic discussion and sought to influence how the dispute was presented. Secret classification does not remove advocacy. Its assertions about public opinion are not a representative survey. Its account of Soviet aims is an inference by a participant, not privileged access to every Soviet motive. It is therefore strong evidence for how Western negotiators interpreted and explained the crisis, while its causal claims need comparison with Soviet and other records.
The documents are most useful together because they show different stages and perspectives. July planning records uncertainty and concern about communication. The September note preserves Soviet conditions and accusations. October reasoning shows why US officials presented the disagreement as fundamental. Differences in date prevent us from pretending that the authors were all responding to precisely the same situation. Differences in audience and purpose help explain emphasis without making every inconsistency deception.
Their combined value supports a qualified judgment. Negotiations involved practical rules with political implications, competing claims of authority and concern about how concessions would be interpreted. Yet this source set remains incomplete: two documents come from US officials, all are accessed through one edited series, and none supplies a complete operational or German civilian account. A fuller explanation would add British and French records, Soviet internal evidence, implementation discussions and the 1949 settlement. The three sources make a strong starting point for explaining obstacles; they do not close the entire crisis.
Worked example: Assess Marshall’s July telegram, the September Soviet note and Bohlen’s October memorandum for investigating failed Berlin negotiations.
The confidential diplomatic audience strengthens its value for planning, but does not make it a neutral description of Soviet intentions. Marshall was directing US representatives and criticising a British draft. The source records US concerns and judgments at that moment. It cannot tell us whether contemplated convoys or sanctions were eventually adopted, whether the food offer was implemented, or why Soviet decision-makers made every choice. A planning document is strongest for contemplated policy, and needs outcome evidence before supporting claims about effects.
The Soviet note provides a contrasting formal position. It describes Western currency changes as damaging to the Soviet zone and treats implementation of the 30 August framework as central. Its conditions concerning currency, trade and air traffic show why practical administration mattered. It is particularly useful for identifying what the Soviet government demanded and how it justified those demands to other governments. The explicitly conditional framework helps explain why agreement in principle did not settle implementation.
Bohlen's memorandum is valuable for the later Western interpretation of failure. He urges representatives to frame the issue as political pressure against occupation rights rather than a technical disagreement. That distinction helps explain why proposed currency arrangements might be rejected even if they addressed some practical problems: officials could consider the larger implications unacceptable. His account also names the conditions from which Western officials drew their conclusion about Soviet intentions.
Answer: Their combined value supports a qualified judgment. Negotiations involved practical rules with political implications, competing claims of authority and concern about how concessions would be interpreted. Yet this source set remains incomplete: two documents come from US officials, all are accessed through one edited series, and none supplies a complete operational or German civilian account. A fuller explanation would add British and French records, Soviet internal evidence, implementation discussions and the 1949 settlement. The three sources make a strong starting point for explaining obstacles; they do not close the entire crisis.
Check your understanding: What do the three sources establish together, and what perspectives remain absent?
Answer: Their combined value supports a qualified judgment. Negotiations involved practical rules with political implications, competing claims of authority and concern about how concessions would be interpreted. Yet this source set remains incomplete: two documents come from US officials, all are accessed through one edited series, and none supplies a complete operational or German civilian account. A fuller explanation would add British and French records, Soviet internal evidence, implementation discussions and the 1949 settlement. The three sources make a strong starting point for explaining obstacles; they do not close the entire crisis.
Why: Review the actual dated sources and their limits. Reading and these unmarked practice models do not establish mastery, a predicted grade, full route coverage or authenticated independent NEA.